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When an employer rejects an otherwise qualified job applicant or
restricts the advancement of a qualified employee, oftentimes the in-
stance is not isolated. Consequently, the class action' has become an
important procedural device in the litigation of employment discrimi-
nation cases, frequently involving women 2 and racial minorities.3  It
has also proven to be a valuable tool in redressing wrongs against the
handicapped in the fields of education, 4 residential institutionaliza-
1. A class action is a procedural device "by which, where a large group of persons are
interested in a matter, one or more may sue or be sued as representatives of the class without
needing to join every member of the class." C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 345 (3d
ed. 1976). For a comprehensive treatment of the class action procedure, see, e.g., H. NEW-
BERG, CLASS ACTIONS (1977) (in 6 volumes); B.L. SCHLEI, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW 278-369 (1976); 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL
§§ 1751-'1771 (1972); 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL
§§ 1772-1803 (1972). The leading case on class actions is Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940),
in which the Supreme Court, after a discussion of what constitutes a class action, held that to
bind the petitioners to a judgment rendered in an earlier action in which they had not partici-
pated would deny them due process since the earlier action did not meet the requirements of a
class action.
2. See, e.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 1011 (1975) (class of past and present female employees challenged discriminatory hiring
and promotion practices); Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 24 (N.D. Cal.
1977) (stewardess sued on behalf of all stewardesses regarding discriminatory policy as to preg-
nancy leave); Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 71 F.R.D. 461 (N.D. Ind. 1976) (class consisted of
former and present women employees who challenged employer's discriminatory layoff prac-
tices); Polston v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 11 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 371 (W.D. Ky. 1974)
(former female employee represented past and present female employees in charges involving
discriminatory employment practices).
3. See, e.g., Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1975) (class of all black
persons who had been or might be affected in the future by the unlawful employment practices
of the employer); East Texas Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 505 F.2d 40 (5th Cir.
1974), rev'd, 431 U.S. 395 (1977) (Mexican-American truck drivers seeking to represent all
blacks and Mexican-Americans in the collective bargaining unit); Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34 (5th
Cir. 1974) (class of blacks discharged by employer, those who had applied for employment, and
those who would have applied had there been no racial discrimination); Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express, 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969) (class of all blacks who had suffered from a
number of discriminatory practices by an employer represented by one who had suffered from
only one of those practices); Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 24, 48-49
(N.D. Cal. 1977) (class comprised of black, Hispanic and American Indian grocery store dis-
tribution center employees challenged racially discriminatory policies of compensation and
terms of employment).
4. See, e.g., Frederick L. v. Thomas, 419 F. Supp. 960 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 557 F.2d
373 (3d Cir. 1977) (learning disabled children deprived of adequate and appropriate education);
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tion, 5 and public transportation. 6  Yet, in spite of a successful record
in these areas, little has been written or reported on the use of the
class action in cases of employment discrimination against the hand-
icapped. Since statistics show that large numbers of handicapped per-
sons are ready and willing to perform but are unable to secure
employment,7 it is relatively certain that widespread discrimination is
occurring. Why then does current reported case law not reflect
greater usage of the class action by handicapped employment dis-
criminatees? Various reasons have been asserted for avoiding the class
action in these cases. 8 Additionally, trial courts, when confronted
with such actions, may have preferred to restrict the representative
plaintiffs to individual suits or to joinder with other identified claim-
ants. 9 Nevertheless, because of its definite advantages, the class ac-
tion may be the most appropriate course to follow when an employer
allegedly discriminates against handicapped persons in any employ-
ment-related practices.
The purpose of this Comment is to encourage attorneys to bring
class actions on behalf of handicapped persons who have fallen victim
Panitch v. Wisconsin, 371 F. Supp. 955 (E.D. Wis. 1974), continued after stay 390 F. Supp.
611 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (three judge court) (handicapped children's right to education); Lebanks v.
Spears, 60 F.R.D. 135 (E.D. La. 1973) (mentally retarded children's right to free public educa-
tion); Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) (handicapped children's equal
opportunity for education); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F.
Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (mentally retarded children denied access to free public school
education).
5. See, e.g., Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (children admitted or
committed to mental facilities); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (N.D. Ala. 1972) (all pa-
tients involuntarily confined for mental treatment purposes in state mental institutions).
6. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977) and Bartels v.
Biernat, 405 F. Supp. 1012 (E.D. Wis. 1975), two actions brought by classes of mobility hand-
icapped persons challenging the barriers imposed to their use of public mass transit systems.
7. The most recent statistics indicate that 1,669,161 of the 7,264,631 handicapped persons
who are able to work are not in the labor force. [1976] 2 EMPL. Pic. GUIDE (CCH) 5373 (fact
sheet entitled Who Are the Handicapped?). See Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A History of Unequal
Treatment: The Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a "Suspect Class" Under the Equal
Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA LAw. 855, 864 & nn.60-68 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Burgdorf]; Wright, Equal Treatment of the Handicapped by Federal Contractors, 26 EMORY
L.J. 65, 68 n.13 (1977); Note, Potluck Protections for Handicapped Discriminatees: The Need to
Amend Title VII to Prohibit Discrimination on the Basis of Disability, 8 Loy. CHI. L.J. 814,
815 & n.6 (1977).
8. Critics of the policy of allowing class treatment of the handicapped argue that a "hand-
icapped" person is not readily identifiable, and, even if he can be identified, he may be unable
to perform in a given capacity specifically because of the characteristic defect. See notes 62-81
and accompanying text infra.
9. In the federal courts, a person will be "joined", or made a party to the action, if his
presence as a party is necessary for just adjudication. FED. R. Civ. P. 19. Furthermore, provi-
sion is made for permissive joinder, by which a party may be joined if he asserts a right arising
out of the same transaction and there is a common question of law or fact. Id. 20(a). However,
1136
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to employment discrimination. In initiating a class suit, it is suggested
that the attorney first consider the remedial laws available to the
handicapped employment discriminatee and then, if a choice exists,
select the forum in which the procedural law is most conducive to
such an action. This Comment will survey the remedies available to
the discriminatee under federal and state law, discuss and compare
the federal rule 10 and state class action statutes, and examine the
individual requirements of the rules, focusing on the special problems
they may present in handicap employment discrimination cases.
REMEDIAL LAW
Although federal law is often preferred to state law, it does not
always appear to be the best choice in handicap employment dis-
crimination cases. In fact, federal law is out of the question where the
prospective defendant is a private employer, for none of the Constitu-
tional and statutory remedies available are directly applicable to
employers who have no relevant connection with the government.
Additionally, no private right of action has been established, explicitly
or implicitly, under much of the federal remedial law. Unless Con-
gress decides to include the handicapped under the auspices of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,11 handicapped employment dis-
criminatees will have only limited remedies under federal law.
The Constitution offers two potential sources of relief for the hand-
icapped employment discriminatee, both requiring governmental ac-
tion on the part of the defendant employer. The first, the equal pro-
tection clause, 12 offers little solace to the handicapped client who
complains of being denied equal employment opportunity, for there
is no fundamental right to employment,' 3 and the handicapped have
yet to qualify as a "suspect class." 14 Therefore, the court's strictest
joinder is in the court's discretion. Id. 19(b), 21. One reason why courts prefer individual suits
or joinder to class actions is because in the former the litigants are before the court.
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Title VII, as amended by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, color,
religion or national origin by private as well as governmental employers. id. § 2000e-2. Fur-
thermore, a private suit may be filed by the aggrieved party after he receives a right to sue
letter from the E.E.O.C. Id. § 2000e-5().
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
13. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976); Gur-
mankin v. Costanzo, 411 F.Supp. 982, 990 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977).
14. See Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 411 F. Supp. 982, 992 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d
184 (3d Cir. 1977), where the court distinguished the handicapped from suspect classes because
of the ability to justify the classification on grounds of the differing abilities of the handicapped
and the non-handicapped. The essential features of a suspect class are that the members are
"'saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment,
or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection
1978] 1137
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standard of review, requiring the employer to justify his actions
through a showing of compelling governmental interest in the con-
duct, cannot be invoked. Discriminatory conduct by the employer
toward the handicapped is not likely to be found unconstitutional via
the less stringent rational basis standard, for the court will not disturb
a practice in which the employer appears to have a legitimate interest
to which the plaintiff's handicap is reasonably related. 15 Thus, an
interest in safety or efficiency will provide a legitimate reason for the
employer to exclude the handicapped.16
Secondly, the employer's practices may be challenged under the
due process clause. 17 The handicapped employee may allege, for
example, that he was fired without a proper hearing,18 or that the
employer violated the plaintiff's due process rights by creating an ir-
rebuttable presumption that the plaintiff is unable to perform. 19 Yet,
regardless of the challenge, some form of governmental action, state
or federal, must be established in order to bring the employer within
from the majoritarian political process." San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 28 (1973). A strong argument can be made for designating the handicapped as a suspect
class. See, e.g., Burgdorf, supra note 7, at 905-08. Handicapped persons are obviously "saddled
with disabilities," and, at least as to the mentally handicapped, politically powerless. Further-
more, society often shuns the handicapped, resulting in stigmatization and unequal treatment in
all walks of life. See also In re G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441, 447 (N.D. 1974) (court recognized
plaintiff's physical handicap as an accident of birth to which the inherently suspect classification
should be applied).
15. See, e.g., Spencer v. Toussaint, 408 F. Supp. 1067, continued after stay 425 F. Supp.
984 (E.D. Mich. 1976), in which plaintiff, who had a prior history of mental illness, brought suit
under the equal protection clause because she was denied a position as a bus driver. The court
found that the employer had a legitimate interest in safety and that the plaintiff's mental health
was reasonably related to that interest. Under the minimum-rationality analysis, the state's clas-
sification was presumed constitutional. See McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S.
802, 809 (1969); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
16. See Spencer v. Toussaint, 408 F. Supp. 1067, continued after stay 425 F. Supp. 984
(E.D. Mich. 1976).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. V, amend. XIV, § 2.
18. See Bevan v. New York State Teacher's Retirement Sys., 44 App. Div.2d 163, 355
N.Y.S.2d 185 (1974). Bevan involved a tenured school teacher who became blind but was not
allowed to return to work after completing a rehabilitation program. The court ordered
reinstatement and backpay on the ground that a prior hearing was necessary before discharge.
Traditional due process rights in respect to public employment were developed in Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
19. See Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 411 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 184 (3d
Cir. 1977), in which the school district was found to have violated the blind plaintiff's due
process rights by creating the irrebuttable presumption that all blind persons were unqualified
to teach. See also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) '(teacher challenged
mandatory maternity leave); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (prior non-state resident
challenged university out-of-state tuition policy) Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (unmar-
ried father challenged state's statutory presumption of unfitness of all unmarried fathers to raise
their children).
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the scope of the Constitution's prohibitions; this has diluted the po-
tency of the remedy considerably.
Some statutory relief for handicapped employment discriminatees
has been provided under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.20 This Act
is based on the social policy that handicapped persons should receive
preferential treatment with respect to jobs which their disabilities do
not prevent them from performing, since able-bodied persons may
select from a broader range of employment opportunities z.2  Yet, as
is the case with Constitutional sources of relief, the Rehabilitation Act
is limited in its scope. Section 50122 imposes a duty on executive
agencies to establish and maintain affirmative action programs for the
hiring of the handicapped, while Section 503 23 places a similar affir-
mative obligation upon employers with a conractual relationship of
more than $2500 with the federal government. In addition, the com-
plaining applicant or employee in either of these situations is re-
stricted to his administrative remedies, with judicial review permitted
only upon their exhaustion.2 4 It has been held that an implied pri-
vate right of action exists under Section 504,25 which prohibits dis-
20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-94 (Supp. V 1975).
21. Wright, supra note 7, at 98.
22. 29 U.S.C. § 791(b) (Supp. V 1975) provides, in pertinent part, that:
Each department, agency, and instrumentality . . . in the executive branch shall
. . . submit to the Civil Service Commission and to the [Interagency] Committee
[on Handicapped Employees] an affirmative action program plan for the hiring,
placement, and advancement of handicapped individuals in such department,
agency or instrumentality. Such plan shall include a description of the extent to
which and methods whereby the special needs of handicapped employees are being
met. Such plan shall be updated annually, and shall be reviewed annually and ap-
proved by the Commission.
23. Id. § 793(a). Section 503 states that:
Any contract in excess of $2,500 entered into by any Federal department or agency
for the procurement of personal property and nonpersonal services (including con-
struction) for the United States shall contain a provision requiring that, in employ-
ing persons to carry out such contract the party contracting with the United States
shall take affirmative action to employ and advance in employment qualified hand-
icapped individuals ...
24. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970). See McNutt v. Hills, 426 F. Supp. 990 (D.D.C. 1977) for an
example of administrative procedure and review under Section 501.
25. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1975), stating that:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States ... shall, solely
by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiv-
ing Federal financial assistance.
The Seventh Circuit held that an implied private right of action exists under Section 504 in
Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277, 1284-88 (7th Cir. 1977), in which a class of
mobility-handicapped persons brought an action to eliminate barriers to the handicapped on
public transportation.
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crimination against the handicapped by recipients of federal financial
assistance. 26 Yet, once again, the requirement of a governmental
nexus narrows the scope of this remedy.
State law, in many instances, offers greater protection for the rights
of handicapped employment discriminatees. While some statutory
provisions enacted in this area constitute mere statements of policy,
27
many state laws are of substantial practical value. 28 In Illinois, for
26. For purposes of Section 504, "recipient" means:
any state or its political subdivision, any instrumentality of a state or its political
subdivision, any public or private agency, institution, organization, or other entity,
or any person to which Federal financial assistance is extended directly or through
another recipient, including any successor, assignee, or transferee of a recipient,
but excluding the ultimate beneficiary of the assistance.
42 Fed. Reg. 22678 (1977) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(o).
Also, "federal financial assistance" has been defined as:
any grant, loan, contract (other than a procurement contract or a contract of insur-
ance or guaranty), or any other arrangement by which the Department provides or
otherwise makes available assistance in the form of
(1) funds;
(2) services of Federal personnel; or
(3) real and personal property or any interest in or
use of such property ...
Id. (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(h)).
27. For example, every state has enacted a version of the White Cane Law, which states
that it is the policy of the State to encourage disabled persons to become involved in the State's
social and economic life, but which is devoid of effective enforcement. Note, supra note 7, at
836 & nn.135 & 141 (1977). See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.06.010-.050 (1974); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 23, §§ 3361-66 (1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-175.1 to .3 (1975).
28. In recent years state statutes have been enacted making employment discrimination
against the handicapped a misdemeanor and/or providing for a fine and/or imprisonment. Com-
missions have been established to investigate complaints and prosecute offenders under civil
rights, human rights, or fair employment practices acts. Often, the laws protect only the physi-
cally disabled. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1976); CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 1410, 1412, 1413 (West Supp. 1978) (in addition to physical handicap, this statute covers
"medical conditions" related to cancer and provides for class procedure within the administra-
tive process (§ 1421.1)); D.C. CODE ENCY. §§ 6-1502 to 1508 (West Supp. 1977); FLA. CONST.
art. 1, § 2 and FLA. STAT. ANN. § 413.08 (West Supp. 1977); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 378-1 to 10
(1976); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 601A.1 to .17 (West 1975); KAN. STAT. §§ 4 4 -1002(j), 1009(a)(1)
(Cum. Supp. 1976); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 613.310-430 (1975) (the aggrieved party is given the
right to seek an injunction from the State's district court after procedure through the commis-
sion); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 128-15.3 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (applies to the state personnel system
only and is devoid of enforcement); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-2 (Cum. Supp. 1977); TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4419e, §§ 1-8 (Vernon 1976) (a very weak statute "entitling" the blind and
the physically handicapped to "public" employment); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 497 (Supp.
1977) (the aggrieved party is given a private right of action for injunction or damages (§ 498(a));
VA. CODE § 40.1-28.7 (1976) (the aggrieved party is given a private right of action for an injunc-
tion which must be exercised within 90 days of the alleged discrimination); W. VA. CODE §
5-11-1 to 10 (Cum. Supp. 1976) (protects blind discriminatees only).
Many other states provide protection for the mentally handicapped as well as the physically
handicapped. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 65-21 to 31 (1975) (private right of action for
damages or injunction or declaratory relief) and ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 851-905 (1975); IND.
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example, the Fair Employment Practices Act 2 9 (FEPA) applies to all
public employers and to those private employers who employ the
requisite number of persons for a given amount of time. 30  The
FEPA includes discrimination against the individual with a "physical
or mental handicap unrelated to ability" within the scope of unfair
employment practices. 31 An even better source of relief exists in the
Illinois Equal Opportunities for the Handicapped Act (EOHA). 32 Al-
though promulgated as a criminal statute, 33 the EOHA provides for a
private right of action for damages or for "any order granting him
CODE ANN. §§ 22-9-1-1 to 13 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1977); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4571
(West Cum. Supp. 1977); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§ 17-20 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (human rela-
tions commission has power to bring a civil action for temporary injunction against offending
employer); MASS. ANN. LAwS ch. 149 § 24K (West 1976); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 64-301
to 330 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (after filing with human rights commission, aggrieved party has a
private right of action for any relief); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-1101 to 1125 (1974); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 354-A:1 to 14 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. EXEC. LAw §§ 290-301 (McKinney Cum.
Supp. 1972-77); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4112.01-.99 (Page 1973 & Supp. 1977); OR. REv.
STAT. §§ 659.400-435 (1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-63 (Purdon Supp. 1977) (private
right of action is permitted if, after one year of filing with human rights commission, no action
has been taken and the practice continues); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8-4131 to 4132 (Cum. Supp.
1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.60.010-320 (Supp. 1976) (human rights commission may
award up to $1000 award for loss of rights); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.31-.37 (West 1974 & Cum.
Supp. 1977).
See Schlei, supra note 1, at 226-30; Note, supra note 7, at 835-44; Note, Equal Employment
and the Disabled: A Proposal, 10 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 457, 460-65 (1974), for further
discussion of protection of handicapped workers under state law.
29. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 851-905 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as FEPA].
30. Id. § 852(d) (Supp. 1976), where employer is defined to include:
(i) any person .. .employing 50 or more persons within the State within each of 20
or more calendar weeks within the current or preceding calendar year prior to July
1, 1968, beginning July 1, 1968, any person employing 25 or more persons during
20 or more calendar weeks within any calendar year, and beginning January 1,
1976, any person employing 15 or more persons during 20 or more calendar weeks
within any calendar year; (ii) the State and any political subdivision, municipal cor-
poration or other governmental unit or agency thereof, without regard to the
number of employees. The term 'employer' does not include any religious corpora-
tion, association, educational institution or society with respect to the employment
of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying
on by such corporation . . . of its activities.
31. Id. § 853(a).
32. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 65-21 to 31 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as the EOHA].
The statute provides that it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer:
to refuse to hire, to discharge, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with
respect to his terms, conditons or privileges of employment, otherwise lawful, be-
cause of such individual's physical or mental handicap, unless it can be shown that
the particular handicap prevents the performance of the employment involved. ...
Id. § 65-23(1).
33. Id. § 65-28 which states that "[a] ny person who commits a discriminatory employment
practice . . . is guilty of a class C misdemeanor."
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employment, or for any other relief which the court may allow." 34
Furthermore, the action may be brought against any employer who
has behaved discriminatorily. 35 Retaliatory measures taken by the
employer because of the employee's exercise of his rights under the
Act also are prohibited. 36 Because of such laws, representatives of
handicapped employment discriminatees should give serious consid-
eration to bringing an action based on state rather than federal law.
PROCEDURAL LAW
Differences in Federal and state procedure, in addition to Federal
and state substantive law, have a major impact on choice of forum,
particularly if the case possesses class characteristics. In spite of its
complexities, a class action suit offers a very convenient means of
litigation for the court, the plaintiffs, and the defendants. 37  Such a
suit frees the court from the burden of repetitious adjudication of
identical actions. In addition, a class action suit permits injured par-
ties to spread the cost of expensive litigation over a greater number of
persons and affords the defendant the opportunity to avoid multiple
litigation and the accompanying imposition of multiple and varying
standards. 38 Nevertheless, the binding effect of the judgment ren-
dered in a class suit requires the courts to balance the convenience
factor against the need to protect the absent parties. This balancing
process is evident in class action statutes themselves, especially Fed-
eral Rule 23, 39 in which efforts have been made to ensure proper
representation of, and notification to, all prospective class members.
The way in which a particular jurisdiction satisfies this due process
requirement is likely to be a decisive factor in the determination of
34. Id. § 65-29.
35. Id. § 65-22, defining "employer" as "a person or governmental unit or officer in this
State having in his or its employ one or more individuals; and any person acting in the interest
of an employer, directly or indirectly."
36. Id. § 65-25, providing that:
It is an unlawful employment practice for any employer or labor organization to
discharge, expel or otherwise discriminate against any person because such person
opposed any unlawful employment practice specified in this Act or has filed a
charge, testified, participated or assisted in any proceeding arising from this Act.
37. See, e.g., Z. CHAFFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 280 (1950).
38. 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 1, at 25-48; Note, State Class Action Statutes: A Compara-
tive Analysis, 60 IowA REV. 93 (1974). See, e.g., Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472,
484-85, 488 (E.D. N.Y. 1968); Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal.2d 695, 715, 433 P.2d 732, 746,
63 Cal. Rptr. 724; 738 (1967).
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 23, which states, in pertinent part:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous
1142
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which forum is better for purposes of handicap employment discrimi-
nation class actions.
that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if
the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of
the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to indi-
vidual members of the class which would establish incompatible
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class
which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of
the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially
impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole;
or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the mem-
bers of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent
to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individu-
ally controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent
and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced
by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of
concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the
difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be Maintained; Notice;
judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as
a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so
maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be
altered or amended before the decision on the merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall
direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be iden-
tified through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that
(A) the court will exclude him from the class if he so requests
by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not,
will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C)
any member who does not request exclusion may, if he desires,
enter an appearance through his counsel.
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivi-
sion (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and
describe those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The judg-
ment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(3),
whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and specify or describe
those to whom the notice provided in subdivision (c)(2) was directed, and
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Rule 23
Before certification to proceed as a class will be granted in a federal
court, section (a) of Federal Rule 23 requires that four prerequisites
must be met: (1) the class must be so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable; (2) there must be questions of law or fact
common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties must be typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4)
the representative parties must fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class. The first two requirements -those of numeros-
ity and commonality -apply to the class itself, while the latter
two-typicality and representativity-are applicable to the named
plaintiff(s) seeking to represent the entire class. Of the four, the nu-
merosity requirement is least likely to create a class certification
problem, since the standard is one of impracticability, not impossibil-
ity, of joinder of the parties. 40  The courts do not apply a strict num-
erical test in determining whether the proposed class consists of an
adequate number of members. Rather, they examine the surrounding
circumstances of the case at hand, including the geographical loca-
tions of the plaintiffs, the size of the individual claims, the type of
relief required, and the ability and likelihood of individual members
bringing individual lawsuits. 41
Difficulties are more likely to occur with respect to the re-
quirement that common issues of law or fact exist among all class
who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members
of the class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought . . . as a class action
with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into subclasses
and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then
be construed and applied accordingly.
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to which this rule
applies, the court may make appropriate orders: . . . (2) requiring . . . that notice
be given in such manner as the court may direct to some or all of the members of
any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the oppor-
tunity of members to signify whether they consider the representation fair and
adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into
the action; ....
40. Connolly & Connolly, Qualifying Title VII Class Action Discrimination Suits: A Defen-
dant's Perspective, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 181, 183 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Connolly]; Forde,
Illinois' New Class Action Statute, 59 Cm. B. REC. 120, 122 (1977); Smalls, Class Actions
Under Title VII: Some Current Procedural Problems, 25 AM. U. L. REV. 821, 835 (1976).
41. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 346-47 & nn.17 & 18; Forde, supra note 40, at 122.
Connolly, supra note 40, at 184, observes that cases indicate that the lower benchmark of an
insufficient number is about 25. See also Roman v. ESB, Inc., 550 F.2d 1343, 1348-49 (4th Cir.
1976) (53 persons insufficient to form class); Hill v. American Airlines, Inc., 479 F.2d 1057,
1059 (5th Cir. 1973) (six insufficient); DeMarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 845 (2d Cir. 1968) (16
insufficient); Cypress v. Newport News Gen. & Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648, 653
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members. For instance, it is unclear whether a court will find com-
monality where class members suffer from different handicaps or from
various degrees of the same handicap, where some are applicants and
others are current or former employees, or where the jobs held or
desired are not the same. However, a common factual issue will arise
where the defendant allegedly acted on grounds generally applicable
to the class, as required for maintenance of the action under
23(b)(2).4 2  So, for example, if plaintiff employees and/or applicants
allege a pattern of discriminatory conduct toward the class by the
defendant employer, the commonality requirement of 23(a)(2) is au-
tomatically satisfied 43 regardless of the individual circumstances of
each member. 44
The commonality requirement may also be met by pleading that
there is a common question of law, as where a statute covers an en-
tire class of persons who wish to challenge its validity or its interpre-
tation. While factual situations pertaining to the application of the law
may vary among class members, the law itself remains a common
issue. 45
(4th Cir. 1967) (18 sufficient); Utah v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 49 F.R.D. 17, 21 (C.D.
Cal. 1969) (840 insufficient).
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) (certification of class possible if opponent has acted or refused
to act on grounds generally applicable to the class).
43. See, e.g., Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 24, 41 (N.D. Cal. 1977),
where the court recognized that Title VII cases, involving employment discrimination based on
race or sex, normally falling within 23(b)(2), are likely to meet the common question require-
ment if they meet the (b)(2) test. That court stated that "a demonstration with some specificity
(i.e. more than the mere conclusory claim of racial or sex-based discrimination) and their com-
mon application to a defined class should substantially satisfy the commonality requirement in
Title VII cases." Id. at 41.
44. The majority of the decisions regarding common questions have held that the presence
of individual questions will not prevent satisfaction of 23(a)(2). 1 H. NEWBERC, supra note 1, at
183. See, e.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969) (racial
discrimination in employment); City of New York v. G.M.C., 60 F.R.D. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(antitrust); Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, 59 F.R.D. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (sex discrimination
in employment); Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd mem., 406 U.S.
913 (1972) (criminal justice); Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 307 (E.D.
Mo. 197 1)(consumer credit). But see Ward v. Luttrell, 292 F. Supp. 165 (E.D. La. 1968). Ward
involved a challenge to state labor laws in which the court recognized a common question of law
but refused to allow class procedure because it could conceive of no common questions of fact.
The court's restraint might be explained by the fact that the class sought to be certified was
very, very broad-all female workers in the state.
45. See, e.g., Like v. Carter, 448 F.2d 798 (8th Cir. 1971), in which a class action was filed
on behalf of eligible welfare recipients who wished to have their applications processed within a
certain time period. Even though the factual situations regarding the processing delay varied
from recipient to recipient, a common question of law was found sufficient to meet the 23(a)(2)
requirement.
Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 24, 54-58 (N.D. Cal. 1977). Harriss
involved seven Title VII race and sex discrimination cases in which the certification of classes
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Normally, a plaintiff has no problem meeting the typicality re-
quirement if the other requirements have been satisfied. Some courts
prefer to ignore this prerequisite, 46 while others use it to reinforce
adequacy of representation, 47 or treat it as an aspect of commonal-
ity. 48 The Tenth Circuit, on the other hand, has given typicality its
own independent meaning, requiring a demonstration that other sim-
ilar claims do in fact exist.49 However, it is usually sufficient to al-
lege that like, not necessarily identical, claims would be made by
prospective, though unknown, members of the class, and satisfaction
of the commonality and representivity requirements will generally
guarantee that the claim is typical.
As to the final requirement of 23(a), the named plaintiff will be
deemed an adequate representative of the prospective class if (1) his
interests do not conflict with those of the class, 50 (2) his attorney is
was sought after the cases were consolidated. Two actions involved proposed classes which
included groups of employees with varying terms and conditons of employment, different status
and different locations. Therefore, the court refused to certify them.
46. See, e.g., Jones v. United Gas Improvement 68 F.R.D. 1, 21 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (racial
discrimination in employment case in which typicality was automatically satisfied because com-
monality was satisfied); Thompson v. T.F.I. Co., 64 F.R.D. 140, 146-49 (N.D. I11. 1974) (anti-
trust case in which court found numerosity, commonality, and representivity satisfied, but failed
to even mention the typicality requirement).
47. See Note, Federal Civil Procedure-Class Actions-Rule 23(a)(3) Typicality Require-
ment Has Independent Meaning, 25 KAN. L. REV. 126, 129-32 (1976). This appears to be the
most popular interpretation. Id. at 130. Three tests have been adopted in order to determine
whether the named party's claim is "typical" enough to provide adequate representation: (1) the
"benefit" test, as enunciated in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968),
rev'd on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (the determinative issue is whether the class will
benefit from a successful class action brought by the representative); (2) the "no conflict" test,
adopted by the court in Mersay v. First Republic Corp. of America, 43 F.R.D. 465, 468-69
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (the representative must not have interests which conflict with those he pur-
ports to represent); and (3) the "exact equation" test. This last test is similar to the "no conflict"
test, but requires a positive demonstration by plaintiff that he can adequately represent the
class' interests in light of all circumstances. See, e.g., Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir.
1975); Koos v. First Nat] Bank, 496 F.2d 1162 (7th Cir. 1974); Air Line Stewards & Stew-
ardesses Ass'n, Local 550 v. American Airlines, Inc., 490 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1973).
48. See, e.g., White v. Deltona Corp., 66 F.R.D. 560 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (application of the
standard without explicit acknowledgement of the merger); Pointer v. Sampson, 62 F. R. D. 689,
696 (D.D.C. 1974) (explicitly recognizing the merger of commonality and typicality); Cottrell v.
Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 62 F.R.D. 516, 520-21 (E.D. Va. 1974) (same); Gibbs v. Titelman,
369 F. Supp. 38, 52 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (application of the standard without explicit acknowledg-
ment of the merger).
49. See Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975). The court adopted
the reasoning of the district court in White v. Gates Rubber Co., 53 F.R.D. 412 (D. Colo.
1971). The Taylor view of typicality is discussed in Note, supra note 47 at 134-40.
50. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555,
562-63 (2d Cir. 1968), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Harriss v.
Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 24, 41 (N.D. Cal. 1977). This criterion covers the
aspect of collusiveness, where the potential representative is bringing the suit in collaboration
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qualified to present the claims of the class, 51 and (3) the representa-
tion is zealous. 52  The fact that the named plaintiffs own claims are
dismissed or become moot, or that the defendant seemingly mends
his ways will not necessarily operate to destroy the adequacy of the
representation. 5:3
Once the 23(a) prerequisites are satisfied, the court must determine
under which, if any, of the three categories of 23(b) the action is to
with the defendant, but, more importantly in relation to employment discrimination, it covers
the situation in which the representative's interests are antagonistic to those of the class. See,
e.g., Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Ass'n Local 550 v. American Airlines, 490 F.2d 636,
642 (7th Cir. 1973) (union cabin attendants not adequate representatives of former stewardesses
who wished to be reinstated); American Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Harlow, 65 F.R.D. 94 (D. Md. 1974)
(immediate distribution of funds from trust to former employee, the class representative, would
diminish the total assets); Lynch v. Sperry Rand Corp., 62 F.R.D. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (union
not adequate representative of union members where it might be directly liable to those it
sought to represent). See also C. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 347-48 (conflict of interests in
stockholder and taxpayer suits).
51. The class attorney must "be qualified, experienced and generally able to conduct the
proposed litigation." Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd on
other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). See also Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239,
247 (3d Cir. 1975); Crocket v. Virginia Folding Box Co., 61 F.R.D. 312, 318 (E.D. Va. 1974).
In Mandujano v. Basic Vegetable Prods., Inc., 541 F.2d 832, 835 (9th Cir. 1976), the court
provided an analysis of counsel's role in class actions, establishing that a lawyer has respon-
sibilities to each class member and that he must assure himself that the members' interests are
compatible with one another. See also Fendler v. Westgate-California Corp., 527 F.2d 1168,
1170 (9th Cir. 1975); Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 24, 42-43 (N.D. Cal.
1977); Lau v. Standard Oil Co., 70 F.R.D. 526, 527 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
52. "[T]he representative parties must show they will put up a 'real fight'." Forde, supra
note 40, at 127. See, e.g., Free World Foreign Cars, Inc., v. Alfa Romeo, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 26,
29 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (suit by auto franchisees, in which adequate representation was said to
consist of adequate legal representation, common interests, and no present or potential conflict);
Hyatt v. United Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 242, 245 (D. Conn. 1970) (plaintiff unfamiliar with
defendant's practices since he had not been employed by defendant for years and was not an
adequate representative); Feder v. Harrington, 52 F.R.D. 178, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (stockhold-
ers' suit in which court stated that it must be assured that the representative will vigorously
pursue the rights of the class through qualified counsel).
53. Dismissal or failure of the representative's claim does not moot the class claim. See,
e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1976); Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co.,
518 F.2d 543, 547-49 (4th Cir. 1975); Roberts v. Union Co., 487 F.2d 387, 389 (6th Cir. 1973);
Moss v. Lane Co., 471 F.2d 853, 855-56 (4th Cir. 1973); Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing
Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377, 1380-82 (4th Cir. 1972); Parham v. S.W. Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d
421, 428-29 (8th Cir. 1970); Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Ref. Corp., 350 F. Supp. 139, 143
(S.D. Ga. 1972). Satisfaction of the representative's claim does not make him an inadequate
representative or moot the class claim. Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 33-34 (5th
Cir. 1968); Cypress v. Newport News Gen. & Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648, 658 (4th
Cir. 1967). Voluntary changes in, or ceasing of, the challenged practice by the defendant will
not render the class claim moot. See, e.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 251
(3d Cir. 1975); Rowe v. G.M.C., 457 F.2d 348, 359 (5th Cir. 1972); Arkansas Educ. Ass'n v.
Board of Educ. of the Portland, Ark. Sch. Dist., 446 F.2d 763, 768 (8th Cir. 1971); Panitch v.
Wisconsin, 371 F. Supp. 955, 959 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Coleman v. Humphreys County Mem.
Hosp., 55 F.R.D. 507, 512 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
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be maintained. 54 If individual adjudications would adversely affect
either the rights of absent class members or of the opponents of the
class, the action qualifies under 23(b)(1). The purpose of this section
is to prevent multiplicity of lawsuits concerning the same subject
matter. It has been utilized, for example, in suits by taxpayers chal-
lenging a public expenditure55 as well as by persons who have been
overcharged by a public utility. 56 If the opponent has behaved in a
manner generally applicable to an entire class, making injunctive or
declaratory relief appropriate as to the whole class, a class action is
maintainable under 23(b)(2). This is the category under which
employment discrimination suits, based on Title VII, have been
maintained. Finally, if common questions of law or fact predominate
over individual claims and the class action is superior to other meth-
ods of adjudication, a class action may be maintained under 23(b)(3),
the most complicated of the three sections. Most of these actions in-
volve antitrust or securities law. 57
The court's determination of which 23(b) category, if any, is appro-
priate will have significant consequences. Because of its use in Title
VII employment discrimination cases, 23(b)(2) seems to be the most
appropriate category under which to litigate handicapped employ-
ment discrimination actions. Maintenance of such suits under 23(b)(2)
also avoids the problems which arise under 23(b)(3). The rule requires
that "the best notice practicable under the circumstances" be given to
each member of a (b)(3) class. 58 The expense of such notice may be
prohibitive, thus preventing the representative from continuing the
action on behalf of the class. Notice, however, is discretionary with
the court as to (b)(2) classes.5 9 A corollary to the notice rule is that
all members of (b)(2) classes will be bound by the outcome of the
case, 60 while judgment rendered in a (b)(3) action will bind only those
who do not request exclusion by "opting out" of the class upon re-
ceipt of notice of the suit. 6 '
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
55. Booth v. General Dynamics Corp., 264 F. Supp. 465 (N.D. I11. 1967).
56. Cass Clay, Inc. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 63 F.R.D. 34 (D.S.D. 1974).
57. See, e.g., In re Home Stake Prod. Co. Sec. Litigation, 76 F.R.D. 351 (N.D. Okla. 1977)
(securities); In re Coordinated Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (antitrust); Illinois v. Harper & Row Pub., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. I11.
1969) (antitrust).
58. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
59. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2).
60. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3).
61. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
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The complexities of Federal Rule 23 pose various problems for the
prospective class representative. These problems may be magnified in
the case of the handicapped individual alleging employment discrimi-
nation, primarily as a function of the commonality requirement of
23(a)(2) and the commonality aspects of 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3).
The anticipation of a commonality problem is likely to have pre-
cluded the filing and the certification of many actions that might have
been successfully resolved on behalf of a class of handicapped
employment discriminatees. 62  Anxiety arises from the existence of a
wide variety of handicaps and the differing degrees of mental and
physical disabilities, as well as the fact that a handicap may affect
one's ability to do a particular job. Critics of the policy of allowing
class treatment of the handicapped argue that, unlike race and sex, a
"handicapped" person is not readily identifiable, and, even if he can
be identified, he may be unable to perform in a given capacity spe-
cifically because of the characteristic defect. 63  It is argued that
because each handicapped individual is unique, the individual cir-
cumstances will always prevail over any claim of common discrimina-
tory treatment. As a result, the handicapped are not susceptible to
classification for purposes of employment discrimination lawsuits.
6 4
Although logical enough on its face, such an argument is not a suffi-
cient reason to totally dismiss the concept of the handicapped as an
aggrieved class.
Perhaps if attorneys and courts were to adopt a uniform definition
of the word "handicapped," much of the uncertainty surrounding the
commonality requirement could be dispelled. The words "handi-
capped" and "disabled" have been given a variety of meanings, with a
62. Practitioners as well as courts have had a tendency to avoid presentation and resolution
of even the simplest class action problems. For example, a great deal of "buck-passing" has
occurred in Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 411 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 184 (3d
Cir. 1977). See note 142 infra. The district court did not decide the class question, and, after
affirming the district court's decision in favor of the named plaintiff, the appellate court re-
manded the case to the lower court for a ruling on the class certification motion. As of this
writing, that motion has yet to be ruled upon.
63. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 7, at 93, 98 n. 108, 101-02 (handicaps are inherently un-
suitable for class treatment). But see Burgdorf, supra note 7, at 858 & n.21, where the author
argues that the handicapped can properly be treated as a class, in spite of dissimilar conditions
among the members of the class, because they do share the same fate as a result of being
labeled as handicapped.
64. See Wright, supra note 7, at 102.
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trend toward broad definition. 65 For example, the Rehabilitation Act
of 197366 defines "handicapped individual" as:
Any person who (A) has a physical or mental impairment which
substantially limits one or more of such person's major life ac-
tivities, (B) has a record of such an impairment, or (C) is regarded
as having such an impairment. 67
Under this broad definition, persons suffering from conditions such as
hypertension and diseases such as cancer are included under the
same heading as the blind, the paraplegic, and the deaf.68 Further-
more, the latest HEW Regulations accompanying Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act 69 provide for the inclusion of persons with virtually
all types of physical or mental disorder. 70
At the state level, although there is a trend toward inclusion of
persons with physical and mental handicaps under the protection of
the laws, 71 only a few states provide fairly clear and detailed statutory
definitions. 72  The Illinois Fair Employment Practices Act, for exam-
65. See, e.g., SCHLEI, supra note 1, at 227. Federal statutory law is the best source of the
meaning of "handicapped" or "disabled". See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1701q(d)(4) (1970) (defines
handicapped as it relates to national housing); 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1) (1970) (defines handicapped
children as it relates to education); 38 U.S:C. § 601(1) (1970) (defines disabled, in regard to
veterans, including "disease, injury, or other physical or mental defect"); 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i)(1),
423(d)(2)(A) (1970) (defines handicapped for purposes of social security benefits); 49 U.S.C. §
1612(d) (1970) (defines handicapped for purposes of mass transit facilities).
66. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (Supp. V 1975).
67. Id. § 706(6). "Substantially limited" is further defined as "likely to experience difficulty
in securing, retaining, or advancing in employment." 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.54 app. A (1976).
Fifteen million handicapped individuals might possess the requisite characteristics under the
706(6) definition to benefit from Section 503. Note, supra note 7, at 832 n.105.
Since the statute prohibits discrimination "in the eye of the beholder," some members of the
potential class cannot be ascertained until the employer actually discriminates against them. See
Wright, supra note 7, at 70. The class may be expanded to include even those who have not
been considered handicapped in the past. Id.
68. SCHLEI, supra note 1, at 227. See Chicago, Milw., St. P. & Pac. HR. v. State
Dep't. of Ind., Lab. & Hum. Rel., 62 Wis.2d 392, 215 N.W.2d 443 (1974) (asthma considered a
handicap in employment discrimination case).
69. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1975).
70. Physical or mental impairment is defined as:
(A) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical
loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological; musculo-
skeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular;
reproductive; digestive; genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine;
or (B) any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic
brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
42 Fed. Reg. 22678 (1977) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(i)).
71. SCHLEI, supra note 1, at 227. See, state statutes cited in note 28 supra.
72. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1413(h), (West Supp. 1978), where "physical handicap" is
said to include "impairment of sight, hearing, or speech, or impairment of physical ability be-
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ple, refers repeatedly to a "physical or mental handicap unrelated to
ability," but never actually defines "handicap." 73  The commission's
guidelines provide only that the Act covers "any handicap which,
with reasonable accommodation, does not prevent performance of the
essential functions of the job in question." 74  The same vagueness
and circularity is evident in the Illinois Equal Opportunities for the
Handicapped Act, where "physical or mental handicap" is determined
to be:
a handicap unrelated to one's ability to perform jobs or positions
available to him for hire or promotion .... It does not constitute
cause of amputation or loss of function or coordination, or any other health impairment which
requires special education or related services." "Medical condition" is defined as "any health
impairment related to or associated with a diagnosis of cancer, for which a person has been
rehabilitated or cured, based on competent medical evidence." Id. § 1413(i).
The District of Columbia defines "blind" person as one who is "totally blind, [or] has im-
paired vision of not more than 20/200 visual acuity." D.C. CODE ENCY. § 6-1508(1) (West Supp.
1977). "Otherwise physically disabled" is defined as "a medically determinable physical impair-
ment . . . which interferes with ability to move about, to assist himself, or to engage in an
occupation." Id. § 1508(2).
Under Ohio law, "handicap" is defined as
a medically diagnosable, abnormal condition which is expected to continue for a
considerable length of time, whether correctable or uncorrectable by good medical
practice, which can reasonably be expected to limit the person's functional ability,
including but not limited to seeing, hearing, thinking, ambulating, climbing, de-
scending, lifting, grasping, sitting, rising, any related function, or any limitation due
to weakness and significantly decreased endurance, so that he cannot perform his
everyday routine living and working without significantly increased hardship and
vulnerability to what are considered the everyday obstacles and hazards encoun-
tered by the non-handicapped.
OHso REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(M) (Page Supp. 1977).
Rhode Island law also provides a detailed definition of physical handicap:
any physical disability, (infirmity), malformation or disfigurement which is caused by
bodily injury, birth defect or illness, including epilepsy, and which shall include,
but not be limited to, any degree of paralysis, amputation, lack of physical coordina-
tion, blindness or visual impediment, deafness or hearing impediment, muteness or
speech impediment, or physical reliance on a seeing eye dog, wheelchair, or other
remedial appliance or device.
R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-5-6(H) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
73. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 851-905 (1975). The act states:
Whereas denial of equal employment opportunity because of ... physical or mental
handicap unrelated to ability . .. deprives a portion of the population . . . of earn-
ings . .. it is declared to be the public policy of this State that . . . equal employ-
ment opportunity or apprenticeship opportunity without discrimination because of
... physical or mental handicap unrelated to ability . . . should be protected by
State law.
Id. § 851 (Supp. 1976). The phrase is also used in sections 853(a), (b), and (c) enumerating the
unfair employment practices.
74. Illinois Fair Empl. Prac. Comm'n, Guidelines on Discrimination in Employment Based
Upon Physical or Mental Handicap Unrelated to Ability § 3.2(c) (1976).
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evidence of 'one's ability to perform jobs or positions available to
him for hire or promotion' . . . that a person . . . in need of mental
treatment as defined by the Mental Health Code of 1967 , . . or
that the person ... is alleged to have undergone mental treatment
or evaluation. 75
Although guidance is lacking at the state level as to the definition of
"handicapped," the standards which have been promulgated allow for
the same breadth as in federal statutory definitions. 76  Some states,
however, provide only for the "physically disabled," 77 thereby leav-
ing the mentally handicapped unprotected.
Non-statutory definitions may also provide insight into who quali-
fies as handicapped. For example, one commentator defines a hand-
icapped person as one
who is afflicted with a mental, physical, or emotional disability or
impairment which makes achievement unusually difficult ....
[P]hysical, mental, or emotional disabilities qualify as handicaps
only if they hinder achievement. [And,] ... the hindrance must
be substantial; a slight inconsequential disability is not a handicap.
[Also,] . . . a person truly qualifies as handicapped only when he
or she is so labeled by others. 78
Courts which have no exact statutory definition to guide them are
likely to consider all definitions offered to them by the attorneys. It is
therefore wise to become familiar with definitions from non-legal
sources as well as those provided by legislation and case law. Careful
study and preparation are extremely important, for the tendency to-
ward broad definition may create a fear in the courts of binding too
many persons with one judgment. An absent party who might require
unique relief would have to settle for general class relief. At the other
end of the spectrum, courts fear involvement in the complicated task
of designing a plan of relief which would conform to individual needs,
should general relief appear to be inadequate for the class as cer-
tified. 79
75. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 65-22 (1975).
76. A statute which is vague simply leaves the task of defining "handicapped" up to the
courts. So, instead of having the legislature enumerate all of the conditions which fall into the
category, the court is permitted to examine other definitions, the case law, and the facts of the
case in order to determine whether or not the particular plaintiff is handicapped. See Chicago,
Milw., St. P. & Pac. R.R. v. State Dep't. of Ind., Lab. & Hum. Rel., 62 Wis. 2d 392, 215
N.W.2d 443 (1974) (court looked to legislative policy and other definitions in arriving at the
decision that the plaintiff, who had suffered from asthma in the past, was "handicapped" within
meaning of state law).
77. See note 28 supra.
78. Burgdorf, supra note 7, at 857.
79. Such a plan was devised by the court in Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (N.D. Ala.
1972). See discussion in text accompanying notes 159 & 160 infra.
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Depending on the definition, a single class of handicapped
employment discriminatees may consist of non-handicapped persons
whom the employer has perceived and treated as handicapped (for
example, so-called "ugly" individuals"0 ), currently handicapped per-
sons who are not labeled as such, persons who were at one time
burdened with an affliction which has since disappeared, and persons
who are currently afflicted with a condition, disease, or traditional
handicap of which the employer is aware. The definition problem is
further complicated by the requirement that the handicapped com-
plainant must have been able to perform a particular job at the time
of the alleged discrimination. 81 How, argue the skeptics, can it be
said that an employer has discriminated against handicapped persons
as a class, when the determination involves an evaluation of each in-
dividual situation? Yet, it is precisely this wholesale rejection of the
handicapped by employers, refusing to evaluate them on the basis of
reasonable and relevant criteria, that creates the pattern of discrimi-
nation which automatically satisfies the commonality requirement
State Class Action Statutes
Because state law may provide a better source of relief for handi-
capped employment discriminatees,8 2 and because of certain jurisdic-
tional restrictions 83 and notice requirements8s4 in the federal courts,
attention should be focused upon the state law governing class action
procedure. Although they vary from state to state, legislative enact-
ments on the subject traditionally have been placed into one of three
categories: 85 (1) those which are patterned after the 1849 Amend-
80. "Ugly laws" at one time prevented "deformed or unsightly" persons from appearing in
public. See, e.g., CHICAGO MUN. CODE § 36-34 (1966) (repealed 1973). Discrimination against
"ugly" persons is widespread in the employment area. See, e.g., Chicago Tribune, Feb. 12,
1978, at 1, col. 2.
81. Statutes generally express that the handicapped individual must also have been "qual-
ified" for the particular job, or that the handicap did not "affect ability. " The meaning of "qual-
ified" opens up a whole new problematic area. See, e.g., 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.2 (1976) (regula-
tions for § 503 of the Rehabilitation Act), which defines "qualified handicapped individual" as
one "who is capable of performing a particular job, with reasonable accommodation to his or her
handicap."
82. See text accompanying notes 27-36 supra. The plaintiff may have a private right of action
and/or a claim against a private employer under certain state laws.
83. In actions which require the $10,000 jurisdictional amount, claims may not be aggre-
gated, but each class member must have at least that large of a claim. Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co.,
414 U.S. 291 (1973).
84. Where notice is required by the rule or by the court, it must be given to all identifiable
class members, plaintiff bearing the burden. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
85. Note, supra note 38, at 93; 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 1, at 304.
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ment of the Field Code of New York; 8 6 (2) those which follow Fed-
eral Rule 23, prior to its 1966 amendment;8 7 and (3) those which
closely resemble the present federal rule."8 A possible fourth cate-
gory may be represented by Illinois' new class action statute.8 9
Regardless of the category into which a statute falls, the rule itself
is not the sole determinant of whether state law is conducive to
maintenance of a handicapped class action. Rather, the state's view of
what constitutes commonality is likely to be decisive, for under some
state laws, the existence of varying individual circumstances will pre-
clude a finding that the common issue requirement is met. This may
create problems in the maintenance of class actions by the handicap-
ped, since such individuals are often unique in certain respects.
The original class action statutes, those patterned after the Field
Code,90 require that parties be numerous and that they be ade-
quately represented by parties who share a "common or general
interest." Since the language is both broad and vague, judicial policy,
rather than the statutes themselves, determines whether or not a
86. The 1849 Amendment states:
[w]hen the question is one of a common or general interest of many persons, or
when the parties are very numerous and it may be impracticable to bring them all
before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of the whole.
N.Y. Laws 72d Sess. 639, ch. 438 § 119 (1849). See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-809 (1962);
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE 382 (West 1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-105 (West 1960); FLA.
R. Civ. P. 1.220 (1967); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-319 (1964); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 233 (1971); S.
C. CODE § 10-205 (1962); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 260.12 (1957).
87. The statute read as follows:
(a) Representation. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it
impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or more, as will
fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued,
when the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a
primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class
thereby becomes entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims
which do or may affect specific property involved in the action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the
several rights and a common relief is sought.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23, 28 U.S.C. app. at 6101 (1964). See, e.g., ALASKA R. Civ. P. 23; GA. CODE
§ 81A-123 (Supp. 1967); IDAHO R. Civ. P. 23; IOWA R. CIv. P. 42; LA. CODE CIV. P. art.
591 (West 1960); MICH. GEN. CT. R. 208; N.M.R. Civ. P. 23; W. VA. R. Civ. P; 23. See
discussion in Wright, supra note 1, at 348-50.
88. FED. R. Civ. P. 23. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7, R. 23 (1972); AFiz. R. Civ. P. 23;
COLO. R. Civ. P. 23; DEL. CODE ANN., Chan. Ct. R. 23 (1971); IND. RULES-TIUAL P. 23; Ky.
R. Civ. P. 23; MASS. R. Civ. P. 23; MINN. R. Civ. P. 23; MONT. R. Civ. P. 23; NEV. R. Civ.
P. 23; OHIO R. Civ. P. 23; S.D. CoMP. LAws § 15-6-23 (Supp. 1973); TENN. R. Civ. P. 23.
89. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 57.2 to 57.7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978). See text accom-
panying note 113 infra.
90. See note 86 supra.
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class action will be permitted. 91 Thus, it is no wonder that the
meaning of "common or general interest" varies from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. The court may require that a community of interest lie in
a specific fund or property, 92 an interpretation which is detrimental
to handicapped employment discriminatees seeking class certification.
Instead of this "common fund" concept, the "unity of interest" stan-
dard may be applied, 93 producing an equally harsh result for hand-
icapped class applicants. Under this standard, class action may be dis-
allowed if separate persons have suffered separate wrongs, even
though the wrongful acts were committed by similar means and pur-
suant to a single plan. 94  Thus, an employer may justify his conduct
under the unity of interest standard by claiming that a particular class
member was rejected for particular reasons, that he applied for a par-
ticular job, or that he had a unique handicap, any of which might
defeat the plaintiffs assertion of commonality.
Nevertheless, at least one Field Code state has been progressive in
its interpretation of the statute. California law requires a clearly as-
certainable class and a strong community of interest in order for the
action to proceed. 95 However, "where one of these elements is ex-
ceedingly strong, the other may be inferred." 96  Community of
interest need not be represented by a common fund or other prop-
erty. Rather, there must be common questions of law or fact and
those questions must be of sufficient impact as to make a class action
more equitable to the parties than a series of individual suits would
be. Although the California statute is based on the Field Code, the
federal rule appears to have been judicially adopted 97 and a policy of
91. Note, supra note 38, at 96.
92. See, e.g., Lile v. Kefauver, 244 Ky. 486, 492, 51 S.W. 2d 473, 475 (1932) (court held
presence of common questions of fact and law insufficient in absence of common fund).
93. See, e.g., Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal.2d 695, 707, 433 P.2d 732, 741, 63 Cal. Rptr.
724, 733 (1967); Newberry Library v. Board of Educ., 387 I11. 85, 95-96, 55 N.E.2d 147, 153
(1944); Brenner v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 276 N.Y. 230, 235-37, 11 N.E.2d 890, 892-93
(1937).
94. Society Milion Athena, Inc., v. Nat'l Bank of Greece, 281 N.Y. 282, 292-93, 22 N.E.2d
584, 587, 590 (1939). See Hall v. Coburn Corp. of Am. 26 N.Y.2d 396, 400, 259 N.E.2d
720, 721, 311 N.Y.S.2d 281, 282-83 (1970) (where purchasers sued merchants for violation of
New York Retail Installment Sales Act, there was no unity of interest since the wrongs were
separate); Gaynor v. Rockefeller, 15 N.Y.2d 120, 129-30, 256 N.Y.S.2d 584, 590 (1965) (separate
wrongs lead to a finding of no unity of interest where blacks alleged discrimination by construc-
tion unions). But see Richards v. Kaskel, 32 N.Y.2d 524, 535-36, 300 N.E.2d 388, 393-94, 347
N.Y.S.2d 1, 8-9 (1973) (unity of interest was found where tenants who refused to purchase
co-operative interests in the building brought action against the landlord).
95. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 382 (West 1973). See aLso Achtenberg, "Crips" Unite to En-
force Symbolic Laws, 4 U. SAN. FERN. U.L. REv. 161, 210-12 (1975).
96. Id. at 211-12.
97. See Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal.2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
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looking to Rule 23 for guidance is evident in the opinions of the
courts of that state. 98 As a result, states like California, which inter-
pret the antiquated Field Code law in light of modern circumstances,
are less likely to present insurmountable barriers to the qualification
of classes of handicapped employment discriminatees than those
which continue to read the rule restrictively.
State statutes which are similar to the original Rule 2399 require
numerous parties, adequate representation, and a community of
interest, which must fall into one of three categories, commonly
designated as true, 100 hybrid, 10 1 or spurious 102 class actions. Though
often criticized,' 03 the "spurious" class seems to be the most appro-
priate for handicapped employment discriminatees, for the right
sought to be enforced must be several, a common question of law or
fact must exist, and common relief must be sought. 10 4 In actuality,
however, the spurious class action merely constitutes permissive join-
der, the judgment being res judicata only as to the named parties and
those who intervene. ' 0 5  Therefore, this type of action does not serve
the intended purpose of the class action-to eliminate the possibility
of multiple lawsuits regarding the same violation. Yet, because the
effect of the judgment is less drastic than tinder other types of stat-
utes, courts applying this statutory model are likely to be more recep-
tive to the argument that a general discriminatory policy toward the
handicapped is sufficient to meet the commonality requirement. 10 6
98. See. e.g., La Sala v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal.3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal.
Rptr. 849 (1973); Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.3d 858, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796
(1971).
99. See note 87 supra.
100. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1), 28 U.S.C. app., at 6101 (1964). A true class action exists
"when the character of relief sought is joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the
owner of a primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby be-
comes entitled to enforce it." Id.
101. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2), 28 U.S.C. app., at 6101 (1964). A hybrid class exists when the
character of relief sought is "several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims
which do or may affect specific property involved in the action." Id.
102. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3), 28 U.S.C. app., at 6101 (1964).
103. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 1, at 349; Note, supra note 38, at 107. Criticisms include
the argument that the spurious action is merely a permissive joinder device and that it has no
binding effect on absent class members.
104. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3), 28 U.S.C. app., at 6101 (1964).
105. See Note, supra note 38, at 107-08.
106. Where the defendant's practices constituted a single discriminatory plan which damaged
the entire class in the same manner, commonality has been found even though individual trans-
actions occurred and amounts of individual recovery varied. See, e.g., Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., 194 F.2d 737, 743 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 820 (1952) (suit by retail liquor dealers
against brewery, involving different times, prices and quantities); Biter v. Keokuk Electro-Met-
als Co., 248 Iowa 710, 82 N.W.2d 151 (1957) (property owners with individual claims of damage
sued a company whose activities polluted the air).
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Just as California courts have followed the present federal rule in
interpreting the Field Code type statute, 10 7 Pennsylvania has judi-
cially adopted the modern Rule 23,108 although the state's statute is
patterned after the old federal rule.' 0 9 This is significant because of
the important legal battles that have been fought on behalf of classes
of handicapped persons in the state of Pennsylvania. 110
Where the modern Federal Rule 23 has been adopted by the state
legislature, the practitioner is still subject to the rule's disadvantages,
including three different categories under which the class may be
maintained and the possibility of mandatory notice to absent mem-
bers, should the class fall into the third category."' Also, although
this type of statute provides more definite guidelines than its pred-
ecessors, it provides less room for judicial creativity on a case by case
basis. Yet, as to the commonality requirement, it is certainly more
liberal than the other statutes, barring a strict judicial construction.
Because of the "pattern of discrimination" line of reasoning widely
accepted in Title VII employment discrimination cases," 2 courts
adhering to the modem rule are likely to certify a class of handicap-
ped employment discriminatees regardless. of differing individual cir-
cumstances.
Finally, Illinois' recent codification of class action procedure offers
an example of how class action statutes can be improved. The statute
states, in pertinent part:
(a) An action may be maintained as a class action in any court of
this State and a party may sue or be sued as a representative party
of the class only if the court finds:
(1) The class is so numerous that the joinder of all mem-
bers is impracticable.
(2) There are questions of fact or law common to the class,
which common questions predominate over any questions af-
fecting only individual members.
107. See text accompanying notes 95-98 supra.
108. See McMonagle v. Allstate Ins. Co., 227 Pa. Super. Ct. 205 (1974).
109. See PA. R. Civ. P. 2230. The rule, which became effective in 1941, excluded any men-
tion of the three class categories, but the courts still incorporated them. 1 H. NEWBERG, supra
note 1, at 354. See, e.g., Charles v. Crestview Prop., Inc., 15 D&C2d 568 (C.P. Daugh. 1957).
110. See Frederick L. v. Thomas, 419 F. Supp. 960 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Gurmankin v. Cos-
tanzo, 411 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977); Bartley v. Kre-
mens, 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v.
Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (three
judge court). These suits have been brought in the federal court system. However, as the state
courts become more experienced in handling such cases and in applying the amended federal
rule, perhaps there will be a shift into the state court system.
111. See note 58 and accompanying text supra.
112. See text accompanying notes 145-49 infra.
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(3) The representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interest of the class.
(4) The class action is an appropriate method for the fair
and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
Notice in Class Actions. Upon a determination that an action may
be maintained as a class action . . . the court in its discretion may
order such notice that it deems necessary to protect the interests of
the class and the parties.
Judgments in Class Actions. Any judgment entered in a class action
• . . shall be binding on all class members . . . except those who
have been properly excluded from the class. 113
Although patterned after the federal rule, the Illinois statute is advan-
tageously dissimilar in certain respects, most notably in that notice to
absent class members is discretionary with the court under all cir-
cumstances.114 Therefore, no extra financial burden is automatically
placed on the plaintiff as in 23(b)(3) actions, even though all Illinois
class actions are theoretically "(b)(3)s," with the opportunity to "opt
out" always available. Additionally, because all actions are "(b)(3)s,"
there will not be a problem with the requirement that the common
issue must always predominate over individual issues. 115 The hand-
icapped will argue that their common bond is the employer's dis-
criminatory policy which is conduct which overshadows the existence
of varying individual fact patterns. Thus, it is no more difficult to
show commonality under the Illinois statute than it is under 23(b)(2)
of the federal statute. Lastly, Illinois' rule is advantageous in that it
requires only that the class action device be an appropriate proce-
dure of disposal, not that it be superior to all other procedures as
required by the federal rule." 6
In summary, when considering the initiation of a class action on
behalf of handicapped employment discriminatees, it is important to
examine the state's class action law in conjunction with its remedial
statutes, instead of jumping immediately into federal court. The
model which the statute follows and its case law interpretation will
113. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 57.2, .4, .6 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978) (emphasis added). The
codification of class procedure does not appear to have created any vast alterations in the courts'
traditional approach, but it has clarified the rules. The standards applied remain basically the
same as those applied by the federal courts. An excellent treatment of Illinois class action law is
provided in Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School, No. 48943 (I11. S. Ct., opinion filed Nov.
term, 1977); Forde, supra note 40; Forde, Class Actions in Illinois: Toward a More Attractive
Forum for This Essential Remedy, 26 DEPAUL L. REv. 211 (1977).
114. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 57.4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978).
115. Id. § 57.2(a)(2).
116. Id. § 57.2(a)(4).
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provide insight into its advantages and disadvantages in comparison to
federal law. At the very least, the state law will be preferable because
it lacks the problematic federal jurisdictional 117 and notice require-
ments. 118 Therefore, if the state court has tended to conform with
modern trends in certifying classes of employment discriminatees
and/or classes of handicapped persons regardless of the statutory for-
mat, and if it has not been inclined to deny certification because of
the existence of individual fact patterns, the state forum is likely to be
the better of the two. This is especially true where a private right of
action against both public and private employers is assured by stat-
ute. 119
The practitioner's pessimism surrounding the initiation of class ac-
tions on behalf of handicapped employment discriminatees can be
eliminated with the realization that, regardless of the type of hand-
icap or the type of position involved, each member has one very im-
portant element in common: the employer's policy of not hiring or
promoting handicapped individuals in spite of their ability to per-
form. 1 20 Once this common issue has been established, the class
may be defined in terms of the employer's conduct, and the existence
of individual circumstances will not bar certification of the class. The
simplest situation arises where the discriminatory policy appears in
writing, 121 is verbally expressed to the present or prospective
employee, or is otherwise visible to agencies and courts. Certification
of a class is further facilitated if the policy applies to only one type of
job, such as teaching, 122 and only to those persons with a specific
handicap. 123 However, even where the policy is camouflaged and is
applied to all handicapped persons who apply for any position or at-
tempt to advance, the class action, though certain to involve compli-
cations, may still be an effective procedural device.
117. See note 83 supra.
118. See note 84 supra.
119. See text accompanying notes 27-35 supra.
120. See Burgdorf, supra note 7, at 858 n.21, where the author acknowledges the propriety
of treating - 'handicapped persons' as a single class for purposes of legal analysis, even though
the underlying physical, mental, or emotional handicapping conditions of individuals included in
that grouping may be quite dissimilar. All such persons are similar in that they have been
considered 'handicapped' and suffered the consequences thereof." See also Note, supra note 7,
at 815, stating that "it is the policy that causes discrimination."
121. See, e.g., Beazer v. New York City Transit Auth., 399 F. Supp. 1032, 1035 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), aff'd, 558 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1977) (discriminatory policy against hiring persons on
methadone maintenance programs was expressed in Transit Auth. Rule 11(b), which covered
"use of drugs").
122. See, e.g., Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 411 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d
184 (3d Cir. 1977).
123. Id. (blind persons).
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THE ARGUMENT FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION IN
HANDICAP EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION ACTIONS
Successful Utilization in Prior Cases
Several good arguments exist for certification of a class of handicap-
ped employment discriminatees. First, handicap classifications have
been successful in several cases. In the area of education, a class con-
sisting of all mentally retarded persons denied access to free, public
education was granted an injunction against the defendant school dis-
trict in Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Pennsyl-
vania.124 Finding that a state statute had been applied by the dis-
trict in such a way as to postpone or deny the plaintiffs' access to
public education, the court ordered a re-evaluation of the named
plaintiff. The school district was further ordered to provide each men-
tally retarded child between the ages of six and twenty-one access to
the educational program appropriate to his respective learning
capacities. 125
In other education-related cases, a class has been certified for: (1)
handicapped children seeking to establish their right to specialized
education at public expense under the equal protection clause; 126 (2)
learning disabled children seeking to force the respondent school dis-
trict to expand and upgrade remedial services for the plaintiff
class; 127 and (3) mentally retarded children bringing a civil rights ac-
tion contesting the denial of public education. 128 In these cases, the
courts have found commonality despite the existence of a wide variety
of handicaps and differing degrees of mental and physical dis-
abilities. 129 Additionally, the courts have delved into individual cir-
124. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), continued after stay 343 F. Stpp. 279 (E.D. Pa.
1972) (three judge court).
125. Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1258
(E.D. Pa. 1971).
126. Panitch v. Wisconsin, 371 F. Snpp. 955 (E.D. Wis. 1974), continued after stay 390 F.
Supp. 611 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (three-judge court).
127. Frederick L. v. Thomas, 419 F. Supp. 960 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 557 F.2d 373 (3d Cir.
1977).
128. Lebanks v. Spears, 60 F.R.D. 135 (E.D. La. 1973).
129. For example, in Frederick L., the court found commonality despite the fact that "learn-
ing disabled" included everything from brain injury to dysplexia, causing factual variations
among plaintiffs. 419 F. Snpp. at 963. The common issue which the court found was the failure
to receive the education to which each class member was entitled.
In Lebanks, the court found commonality despite the broadness of the class defined for cer-
tification, The court ordered certification of the following class of mentally retarded children:
[p]ersons resident of [the] parish who are or become between the ages of five (5)
and twenty-one (21) inclusive; who have been, are, or may be suspected of being
mentally retarded ... ; and who have been, are or may be effectively denied a
1160 [Vol. 27:1135
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cumstances,130 and where appropriate, have prescribed a wide range
of relief' 131 0
Education is not the only area of litigation in which classes of
handicapped persons have been certified. In Bartels v. Biernat 132 a
class of mobility handicapped persons was granted a preliminary in-
junction preventing any action toward obtaining new buses for the
public mass transit system. 133 Since only injunctive relief was sought
and since all 23(a) prerequisites were satisfied, the class was certified
under 23(b)(2).1 34 The court found no reason to review the individ-
ual circumstances of the class members. 135
In Beazer v. New York City Transit Authority, 136 a class of present
and past participants in methadone maintenance programs 137 chal-
lenged the defendant's blanket exclusion of such persons from any
type of employment with the transit authority. The policy that
employees could not use "drugs" was expressed in the employer's
rules and regulations.' 13  The four class representatives-two black
free, publicly supported program of education ... and/or a fundamentally fair pro-
cedure of obtaining the same.
60 F.R.D. at 138.
130. For example, in Panitch, the federal district court refused to label the question moot on
the basis that legislative relief had been enacted, 371 F. Supp. at 959-60, and the class rep-
resentative was not found to be inadequate even though she had been offered public facilities,
but chose instead to remain in a private facility. Id.
In Frederick L., an elaborate fact-finding process, 419 F. Supp. at 962-71, preceded the
court's decision that the defendant had violated state law by failing to identify the learning
disabled and failing to implement an approved plan for their proper education. Id. at 979.
131. For example, in Panitch, the court ordered the state to submit a report detailing its
plans for implementing a statute which had been passed to provide relief for the plaintiff class.
371 F. Supp. at 960.
In Lebanks, the court set out a detailed plan, via a preliminary consent agreement, to effect a
change in the defendant's practices. 60 F.R.D. at 139-53. In addition to the general provisions,
special provisions were made applicable to six groups of class members. The six categories were:
(1) children in regular classes or newly entering school; (2) children suspected of being retarded
or are retarded and not presently served by public schools; (3) children presently in classes for
the mentally retarded who had not been given proper notice, evaluation and hearing; (4) par-
ents of children or children that are or might be retarded; (5) persons over 21 who may have
been suspected of being or were mentally retarded and were without education as children; and
(6) children who are or may be mentally retarded and have discipline problems. Id. at 140-51.
132. 405 F. Supp. 1012 (E.D. Wis. 1975). See Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F. 2d
1277 (7th Cir. 1977), a very similar mobility handicapped class action which was also successful.
133. Bartels v. Biernat, 405 F. Supp. 1012, 1017-19 (E.D. Wis. 1975). The class, including
about two thousand persons, filed suit under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 29
U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1975).
134. Id. at 1016-17.
135. Id. at 1017.
136. 399 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 558 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1977).
137. Id. at 1035.
138. Id.
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and two Hispanic, two rejected applicants and two former
employees-received relief in the form of re-evaluation.13 9  As to the
class itself, the court ordered a permanent injunction containing basic
directions and guidelines, retaining jurisdiction in order to implement
the injunction.140
Finally, in Bartley v. Kremens, 141 a class of all persons eighteen
years or younger who had in the past, might be in the future, or
were presently admitted or committed to state mental institutions
sought certification in order to enjoin enforcement of certain allegedly
unconstitutional state statutes. The individual class members had
been committed under varying circumstances and suffered from
different afflictions. Nevertheless, certification of the class was up-
held.
An analysis of all of these cases provides guidelines for those con-
sidering class procedure on behalf of handicapped employment dis-
eriminatees. 142 First, even though individual circumstances differ
(the type of handicap and/or the particular employment situation),
one common issue of fact or law (application of a certain rule or stat-
ute or a pattern of discriminatory conduct) will give the class the
requisite common thread. Second, in some of these cases, the courts
went beyond simple general injunctive relief. Thus, in employment
discrimination cases, an order enjoining the employer from his dis-
criminatory practices and compelling him to evaluate the handicapped
on reasonable criteria would seem to be a reasonable request. The
court also might ask that a report on these evaluation criteria be
submitted by the employer subsequent to the injunction.
139. Id. at 1059. Eventually all four representatives were rehired and given backpay. See
Beazer v. New York City Transit Auth., 558 F.2d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 1977).
140. Beazer v. New York City Transit Autlh., 399 F. Supp. 1039, 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1975),
aff'd, 558 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1977).
141. 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
142. These guidelines may prove useful when the federal district court resolves the class
certification question in Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 411 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 556
F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977). Gurnankin constitutes a perfect example of how the courts attempt to
avoid the class action question in cases of employment discrimination against the handicapped,
even where the circumstances make the action especially suspectible to group treatment. Gur-
mankin, the blind plaintiff, filed an action on behalf of all visually handicapped individuals
qualified to teach in the public schools of Philadelphia who by virtue of their handicap had
been, were, or would be unable to obtain and secure permanent teaching positions, including in
classrooms on non-handicapped children. Id. at 983. Certification was sought under 23(b)(2).
Complaint filed in U.S. Dist.. Ct. at 4, Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 411 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Pa.
1976). The district court ruled in plaintiffs favor, reserving judgment on the motion for the class
certification; the court of appeals affirmed and remanded the case to the district court for resolu-





A second argument for allowing class action suits by handicapped
employment discriminatees is that such actions can be analogized to
Title VII race and sex class actions. Since the courts have little else to
rely on in the way of employment discrimination law, the Title VII
cases are likely to be influential. It is generally agreed that Rule 23 is
liberally applied to those actions, not only because of the remedial
purpose of Title VII, but also because "employment discrimination on
the basis of a class characteristic is by definition suited to class treat-
ment." 143 Since system-wide discriminatory practices and policies
against the handicapped also constitute employment discrimination
based upon a class characteristic, it may also be said that such prac-
tices and policies constitute class discrimination by definition. In fact,
Federal Rule 23(b)(2) was designed especially for those cases in which
"a party is charged with discriminating unlawfully against a class, usu-
ally one whose members are incapable of specific enumeration." 144
Courts have generally allowed broad class definitions in Title VII
cases, permitting former employees to represent present employees
and applicants regardless of whether all class members were actually
effected by the employer's practice. 145  Proof of a pattern of dis-
criminatory conduct which could potentially affect, or has affected, all
class members has been sufficient grounds for certification. This
across the board" approach, 146 based upon the employer's general
143. Comment, The Class Action and Title VII-An Overview, 10 U. Rich. L. REV. 325,
326 (1976). See, e.g., Parham v. S.W. Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 428 (8th Cir. 1970); Bowe
v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 1969). Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach
Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968). For a comprehensive discussion of the relationship
between Title VII cases and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, see 4 1-, NEWBERG, supra note 1, at 1213-
1392; SCHLEI, supra note 1, at 1085-1134; Connolly, supra note 40; Smalls, supra note 40.
144. Advisory Committee Note to Rule 23(b)(2), 39 F.R.D. 98, 102 (1966). See Wetzel v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 248 (3d Cir. 1975).
145. Comment, supra note 143, at 328. See cases cited in notes 2-3 supra; Henderson v.
First Nat'l Bank of Montgomery, 360 F. Supp. 531, 534 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (black applicants,
both past and future, and employees); Harvey v. Int'l Harv. Co., 56 F.R.D. 47, 48 (N.D. Cal.
1972) (class certified which included anyone who might be or was discriminated against by the
defendant); Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 54 F.R.D. 465, 466 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (all past,
present, and future employees of defendant); Parmner v. National Cash Reg. Co., 346 F. Supp.
1043, 1049 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (women who are or may be employed prospectively).
146. See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969), which
validated the practice of allowing an aggrieved employee to maintain a class action against an
employer who discriminates generally, even though the representative himself was affected only
by a certain aspect of the general practice. Connolly, supra note 40, at 191 states:
[A]ny company-wide policy or practice which is potentially discriminatory .. .can
be challenged by a class action as wide as the application of the policy. Practices
which do not indicate the breadth of their application on their face can best be
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discriminatory policy, may be easily applied to handicapped persons
who suffer fiom such a pattern of discrimination, although perhaps in
different aspects and with different results. Even though the 23(a)
prerequisites must be satisfied, the across the board policy is respon-
sible for the relaxed application of the numerosity, commonality,
typicality and adequacy of representation requirements. Thus, the
handicap advocate might argue that, as in Title VII cases, the nu-
merosity requirement is satisfied pro forma, 147 and that the common-
ality requirement, apparently a major source of apprehension, is met
because of the employer's general discriminatory policy.148 As to
typicality and representivity, the same liberal policy applies, 149 so it
can be argued that a blind discriminatee is an adequate representa-
tive of the deaf, the diabetic, and the paraplegic.
The United States Supreme Court's recent decision in East Texas
Motor Freight v. Rodriguez 150 has been said to cast doubt on the
validity of the "across-the-board" approach in sex and race discrimina-
tion cases.' 5 ' Rodriguez held that where the parties seeking to rep-
resent a class of discriminatees were shown to have been unqualified
for the positions they sought, they could not have suffered injury
from the alleged discrimination, and therefore could not adequately
represent people who were allegedly injured by the employer's prac-
tice. 152  Nevertheless, the court recognized that sex and racial dis-
crimination suits are often class suits by their very nature and that
narrowed by a class action defendant emphasizing the factual differences arising
between plants, departments and even job classifications. If these differences are
adequately demonstrated, the court will realize that . . . the purported class is
really two classes or more.
147. See, e.g., Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543, 547-48 (4th Cir. 1975); Crockett v.
Virginia Folding Box Co., 61 F.R.D. 312, 317 (E.D. Va. 1974); Bormann v. Long Island Press
Pub. Co., 379 F. Supp. 951, 954 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Batiste v. Furnco Constr. Co., 350 F. Supp.
10, 13 (N.D. III, 1972).
148. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. East Tex. Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 50 (5th Cir. 1974),
rev'd, 431 U.S. 395 (1977); Carr v. Conoco Plastics, Inc., 423 F.2d 57, 62 (5th Cir. 1970);
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 417 F.2d 1122, 1124 (5th Cir. 1969); Oatis v. Crown
Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968); Hall v. Werthan Bag Co., 251 F. Supp.
184, 186 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
149. See, e.g., Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543, 547-48 (4th Cir. 1975); Green v.
Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 297 (2d Cir. 1968); Moss v. Lane Co., 50 F.R.D. 122, 124-26 (W.D.
Va. 1970), aff'd in part, remanded in part, 471 F.2d 853 (4th Cir. 1973); Ellison v. Rock Hill
Printing & Finishing Co., 64 F.R.D. 415 (D.S.C. 1974).
150. 431 U.S. 395 (1977). Plaintiffs, three Mexican-American city drivers employed by defen-
dant, sought to represent all of the employer's Mexican-American and black city drivers in-
cluded in the collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the Southern Confer-
ence of Teamsters in the state of Texas. They were challenging the union's seniority rule and
the employer's "no-transfer" policy. Id. at 398-99.
151. See Connolly, supra note 40, at 212-13.
152. East Tex. Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1977).
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"common questions of law or fact are typically present."153 Rather
than ruling out the across the board approach in all cases, the Su-
preme Court seemed to be cautioning against very broad, vague alle-
gations of discrimination by non-representative parties. 154
Feasibility of Providing an Adequate Remedy
A third argument in favor of certification is that plans of relief can
be devised to meet the unique needs of each class member if neces-
sary. First, a bifurcated procedure has been adopted by many
courts, 155 in which injunctive relief is granted under a 23(b)(2) certifi-
cation, requiring no notice, while individual backpay claims are liti-
gated under 23(b)(3), allowing individual discriminatees to appear and
prove their damages. For example, in an employment discrimination
case, the issue of the employer's liability for purposes of injunctive
relief proceeds under 23(b)(2) with no notice or "opting out." Once
liability is established, the litigation of individual backpay claims is
conducted under 23(b)(3), at which point notice to individual class
members is mandatory. 156 This approach may be preferable to an
exclusive Rule 23(b)(2)157 or a "mandatory notice under all cir-
cumstances" 158 approach, for it expedites the determination of liabil-
ity and at the same time provides an opportunity for litigation of indi-
vidual claims for relief.
Second, the court, if it wishes to accept the challenge, can certify a
class of handicapped persons, whose individual characteristics require
individually designed remedies, tinder 23(b)(2) and go on to provide
an equitable plan of relief which is adequate to satisfy all members'
needs. The job may be complex, but it can be accomplished, as has
been demonstrated by the court in Wyatt v. Stickney,' 59 the leading
153. Id. at 405.
154. Id. at 405-06.
155. See, e.g., Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441, 448 (5th Cir. 1973); Harvey v.
Int'l Harv. Co., 56 F.R.D. 47, 48 (N.D. Cal. 1973), Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 321 F. Supp.
1041, 1042-43 (D.D.C. 1971).
156. See Paddison v. Fidelity Bank, 60 F.R.D. 695, 697-99 (E.D. Pa. 1973), which was over-
ruled in Rhodes v. Weinberger, Civ. No. 74-1511 (E.D. Pa. Opin. and order of March 19,
1975) because of the Third Circuit's subsequent decision in Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1975) that backpay claims should be adjudicated in a (b)(2) suit.
157. See, e.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 250-53 (3d Cir. 1975); Robin-
son v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 801-02 (4th Cir. 1971).
158. See, e.g., Bormann v. Long Island Daily Express Pub. Co., 379 F. Supp. 951, 954
(E.D.N.Y. 1974); Alexander v. Avco Corp., 380 F. Supp. 1282, 1286 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Lynch
v. Sperry Rand Corp., 62 F.R.D. 78, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Polston v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 371 (W.D. Ky. 1974).
159. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
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case on the right to treatment in a mental institution. This action,
filed on behalf of all patients involuntarily confined for treatment of
mental illnesses in Alabama's mental institutions, resulted in an order
requiring that detailed reports on each patient's progress and treat-
ment be submitted to the court.160 In addition, the court, in a later
proceeding, designated human rights committees for each institution
to ensure that no further violations of the patients' rights would
occur. Although such intricate forms of relief will be difficult and
time-consuming, the cause of handicapped employment discrimi-
natees is worthy of the courts' extra efforts.
Judicial Willingness to Provide an Adequate Remedy
A fourth argument is the atmosphere of liberality in the certifica-
tion of classes and subclasses in other areas. An excellent example is
found in In re Home-Stake Production Co. Securities Litigation,161 an
adjudication on the certification of a class of purchasers of securities
who wished to bring an action for fraud against the sellers of those
securities. After determining that all of the 23(a) requirements had
been met, the court proceeded to certify the class under 23(b)(3).
Nine classes were then designated for the purposes of the litigation,
one for each year in which certain investments were offered. Each of
these nine classes was further divided into two subclasses. 162 Cer-
tainly, if the courts are willing to be this creative in respect to securi-
ties actions, they should be willing to give the same treatment to
those whose livelihoods may be dependent upon the abolition of un-
fair employment practices.
Finally, even in cases where class certification was not requested,
where the suit was brought only by one handicapped employee on his
or her own behalf, the courts have provided class relief. The major
case on this point is McNutt v. Hills,163 in which a blind employee of
the Department of Housing and Urban Development alleged that the
agency's failure to comply with Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 164 had hampered his career development. 165 The court is-
sued summary judgment for plaintiff, but refused to award any of the
individual relief requested. 166 However, the court did require that
160. Id. at 785-86.
161. 76 F.R.D. 351 (N.D. Okla. 1977).
162. Id. at 376-80.
163. 426 F. Supp. 990 (D.D.C. 1977).
164. 29 U.S.C. § 791 (Supp. V 1975).
165. McNutt v. Hills, 426 F. Supp. 990, 993-94 (D.D.C. 1977).
166. Id. at 1008.
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the agency prepare a detailed report on how it currently met or in-
tended to meet its obligations under the relevant statutes and regula-
tions regarding affirmative action toward the handicapped.' 67
Relief beyond that required for the single physically handicapped
plaintiff was also granted in Smith v. Fletcher,168 a case involving a
handicapped female employee of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration. The plaintiff already had been granted relief in the
form of promotion and backpay, yet the court proceeded to enjoin the
commissioners of the United States Civil Service Commission for
failing to abide by the applicable statutes and regulations. 169 Thus, a
remedy was in actuality provided for an entire class of employment
discriminatees.
CONCLUSION
The class action is a complicated procedural device. It becomes
more complicated when used by the handicapped in an attempt to
redress an employer's discriminatory hiring, firing, and promotion
practices. Still, the rewards of a successful class action in such cases
merit the extra involvement by courts and attorneys. In deciding
whether or not to initiate a class suit on behalf of handicapped
employment discriminatees and selecting the most appropriate forum
for the action, the practitioner should first determine what remedies
are available tinder state as well as federal law and whether or not a
private right of action is provided. He may also need to find a law
which allows him to proceed against a private employer. Once a suit-
able remedial rule has been found, a determination must be made as
to whether a certifiable class can be defined and, if so, Linder which
class action statute. The most important factor in finding a certifiable
class is whether the employer has exhibited a pattern of discrimina-
tion against the handicapped.
Because of the advantages of both remedial and procedural law as it
exists in certain states (Illinois, for example), the horizons of hand-
icapped employment discriminatees are broader than one might ex-
pect. Therefore, it is hoped that the practicing bar will begin to give
more attention to class actions on behalf of these persons. Only then
will the courts be forced to do the same.
Stacey Stutzman
167. id.
168. 393 F. Supp. 1366 (S.D. Tex. 1975), modifJed, 559 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1977).
169. Id. at 1370.
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